



The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

February 2016

This document provides information about the situation of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, including non-registered Palestinian refugees, undocumented (“non-ID”) Palestinians, and Palestine refugees from Syria, including the human rights and humanitarian situation and limitations in relation to refugees’ access to basic services and livelihoods, based on information provided by UNRWA and other available sources. This document is based on information available up to 23 February 2016.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Based on their legal status and registration with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can be categorized into four groups:

- “Registered” refugees (“*Palestine refugees*”), which are registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities;
- “Non-registered” Palestinian refugees, which are not registered with UNRWA, but are registered with the Lebanese authorities;
- “Non-ID” Palestinian refugees, who are neither registered with UNRWA nor with the Lebanese authorities;¹ and
- Palestine refugees from Syria, who have arrived in Lebanon since 2011.²

There are currently over 504,000 Palestine Refugees registered by UNRWA in Lebanon.³ However, it is estimated that many are no longer present in the country. According to a (yet unpublished) study conducted by the American University in Beirut in 2015, between 260,000 and 280,000 Palestine refugees currently remain in Lebanon.⁴ Palestine refugees in Lebanon reportedly continue to face acute socioeconomic deprivation and legal barriers to their full enjoyment of a broad range of human rights. Palestine refugees in Lebanon are reported to have historically been marginalized and excluded from key aspects of social, political and economic life with no right to own immovable property; severely curtailed access to public services (other than those provided by UNRWA), such as health and education; and restrictions regarding specific professions and limited job opportunities.⁵

Despite the 1987 abrogation of the 1969 Cairo Agreement⁶ between the Palestinian leadership and the Lebanese government, which stipulated that the Lebanese army would refrain from entering the Palestine refugee camps, the army generally does not exercise control in the camps. Palestine refugee camps are thus controlled by Palestinian factions, with different camps often ruled by competing factions.⁷ The camps are reported to be generally

¹ Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon (Non-ID Refugees)*, 2014, <http://bit.ly/1W9Jrg7> [hereafter: Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014], pp. 2-3; Danish Refugee Council (DRC), *Survey Report on the Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdad80.html> [hereafter: DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007], pp. 16-17.

² For information on the situation of Palestine/Palestinian refugees in Syria, see UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *International Protection Considerations with regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update IV*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5641ef894.html>, paras 21-22.

³ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), registration numbers as at January 2016.

⁴ American University of Beirut (AUB), *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015 (to be published). See also, United States Department of State, *2014 Report on International Religious Freedom - Lebanon*, 14 October 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5621058315.html>; International Crisis Group (ICG), *Nurturing Instability: Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, Middle East Report N° 84, 19 February 2009, <http://bit.ly/1SaCv4e> [hereafter: ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009].

⁵ AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, Chapter 1.

⁶ The 1969 Cairo Accord is available at: ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, Appendix C.

⁷ “Government security forces reported to civilian authorities, although (...) Palestinian security and militia forces, (...) operated outside the direction or control of government officials. (...) Palestinian refugee camps continued to act as self-governed entities and maintained security and militia forces not under the direction of government officials”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. See also, Al Jazeera, *Palestinians Desperate to Flee Lebanon Refugee Camp*, 5 April 2015, <http://aje.io/pzw2>; Haaretz, *Palestinians in Mideast Find Their Position More Precarious in Wake of Syria War*, 27 March 2015, <http://bit.ly/1Pns0Hc>; Sari Hanafi, *Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: Laboratories of State-in-the-Making, Discipline and Islamist Radicalism*, in: Ronit Lentin, *Thinking Palestine*. London: Zed Books (2008): 82-100, p. 90, <http://bit.ly/1SYzvH2>. For an overview of different factions, see also, Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *Between Radicalization and Mediation Processes: A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, Civil Society Knowledge Center, Lebanon Support, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1nYdCvL> [hereafter: Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015]; ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, p. 1.

characterized by a climate of instability, physical threats, sporadic fighting and limited access to safety and justice.⁸

Palestine refugees are dependent on UNRWA services and relief due to the restricted access to public education, public health care and social services, as well as employment.⁹ These services as well as camp infrastructure were reportedly already overstretched prior to the arrival of tens of thousands of Palestine refugees from Syria.¹⁰ The influx of Syrian and Palestine refugees from Syria into Lebanon are reported to have further compromised already limited living space, resources, services and job opportunities available to Palestine refugees in Lebanon and contributed to heightened community tensions.¹¹

The situation of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 undocumented (“non-ID”) Palestinians in Lebanon is reported to be particularly precarious, as their family history means that they are not registered as Palestine refugees with UNRWA, nor are they recognized by the Government of Lebanon.¹² “Non-ID” Palestinians, as well as the majority of Palestine refugees from Syria¹³ are reported to lack legal status in Lebanon, with wide-reaching implications for their ability to exercise their human rights and access basic services.

In August 2013, new entry restrictions were introduced for Palestine refugees from Syria seeking to access safety in Lebanon.¹⁴ Those Palestine refugees from Syria who were already in the country prior to the issuance of the new regulations (around 42,000 as of August 2015¹⁵) reportedly face restrictions on their ability to exercise their basic human rights, due to their precarious legal status.¹⁶

This document provides information about the situation of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, including non-registered Palestinian refugees, undocumented (“non-ID”) Palestinians, and Palestine refugees from Syria, including the human rights and humanitarian situation and limitations in relation to refugees’ access to basic services and livelihoods. The final section provides an overview of the security situation and potential human rights issues in the camps, as well as specific information on four of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, namely Nahr El-Bared, Rashidieh, Shatila and Ein El-Hilweh.¹⁷

⁸ See below Section VI.

⁹ “Palestinian refugees were prohibited from accessing public health and education services or owning land, and were barred from employment in many fields, making refugees dependent upon UNRWA as the sole provider of education, health care, and social services”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. See also Section II.4.

¹⁰ Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, *Palestinians Refugees Suffer Wherever They Go*, 1 April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1WdWvRS>; Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, *Palestinian Refugees Camps in Lebanon Summary and Proposals*, undated, pp. 4-5, <http://bit.ly/1ok5F4C>; Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP), *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2010, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>.

¹¹ Al Jazeera, *Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilweh*, 31 August 2015, <http://aje.io/hpyn>; The Arab Weekly, *Rising Tensions among Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 10 July 2015, <http://bit.ly/1Q2kjEk>; UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 43, March-April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1nS17E1>; Al-Monitor, *Palestinian-Syrian Refugees Face Hardship in Lebanon*, 7 November 2014, <http://almon.co/29lo>; Muftah, *A Brewing Crisis: Tensions between Palestinian & Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, 9 January 2014, <http://bit.ly/20onVp6>; New York Times, *Palestinian Refugees Flee Syria to Find Poor Conditions in Lebanese Camps*, 29 May 2013, <http://nyti.ms/13ZnXtD>.

¹² See below Section IV.

¹³ See below Section V.

¹⁴ See below Section V.1.

¹⁵ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 45, 1 July - 30 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1SDEezz>.

¹⁶ Amnesty International, *Denied Refugee: Palestinians from Syria Seeking Safety in Lebanon*, 1 July 2014, <http://bit.ly/1PvYqgp>, p. 15.

¹⁷ See below Section VI.

II. PALESTINE REFUGEES

1. Legal Status

Lebanon's regulation of Palestine refugees' status reportedly dates back to 1959, when the Department of Palestinian Refugees Affairs (DPRA) was created.¹⁸ This department is in charge of registering and issuing civil documentation, including travel documents, to Palestine refugees in Lebanon.¹⁹ The Minister of Interior's Ordinance No. 319 of 2 August 1962 details the process for the regularization of residency for Palestinian refugees, in which they are considered to be "foreigners who do not carry documentation from their countries of origin, and reside in Lebanon on the basis of [residency] cards issued by the Directorate of Public Security, or identity cards issued by the [DPRA]".²⁰ However, while the possession of a valid residency or identity card is required to regularize their residency status, there is no clear provision defining what categories of Palestinian refugees are entitled to such a card.²¹ Palestine refugees are reportedly denied citizenship in Lebanon.²²

The Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees (DPAR), which is part of the Ministry of Interior,²³ reportedly maintains the records of Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon. Newborns are reportedly registered with the family's original place of registration, regardless of where in Lebanon they were born. Those registered with DPAR and UNRWA are issued a personal ID card which states that s/he is a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon.²⁴

A refugee's registration with DPAR is reportedly only cancelled in three specific events, namely, (i) in the case of a refugee's death and upon request of the General Security to DPAR to cancel the person's registration following their death, or (ii) if the refugee obtains the nationality of a third country, or (iii) if the refugee has submitted an application to the General Security to have his/her registration cancelled.²⁵

2. Freedom of Movement

According to UNRWA, Palestinian refugees registered with DPAR enjoy freedom of movement within the country. The directorate, however, has to approve the transfer of registration of residence for refugees who reside in camps. According to UNRWA, the directorate generally approves such transfers.²⁶

¹⁸ Jaber Suleiman, *Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, April 2006, <http://bit.ly/1nSjXc8> [hereafter: Jaber Suleiman, *Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, April 2006], p. 12. See also FN 23.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid. See also Frontiers Association, *Falling through the Cracks: Legal and Practical Gaps in Palestinian Refugee Status - A Case Study of Unrecognized Refugees in Lebanon*, August 2005, <http://bit.ly/1TUHshb> [hereafter: Frontiers Association, *Falling through the Cracks: Legal and Practical Gaps in Palestinian Refugee Status*, August 2005], p. 68.

²¹ Ibid.

²² The only exception reportedly are Palestinian refugee women married to Lebanese citizens who are able to obtain citizenship and transmit citizenship to their children; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>.

²³ Formerly known as Department of Palestinian Refugees Affairs (DPRA), which was established by Legislative Decree No. 42 of 1959, with Article 1 stipulating the establishment of a "department within the Lebanese Ministry of Interior to manage Palestinian affairs". In 2010, the Lebanese government passed Decree No. 4082, which renamed the DPRA as "Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees" (DPAR); Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 3.

²⁴ Danish Immigration Service (DIS), *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon - Report from Danish Immigration Service's Fact Finding Mission to Beirut, Lebanon, 25 May to 6 June 2014*, October 2014, <http://bit.ly/1Qt79A2> [hereafter: DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014], pp. 40-41; ILO, *Palestinian Employment in Lebanon - Facts and Challenges, Labour Force Survey among Palestinian Refugees Living in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon*, 2012, <http://bit.ly/1POVcs5>, p. 33; BADIL, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (2006-2007)*, 4 June 2007, <http://bit.ly/1Qa86Dc>, p. 127.

²⁵ In all cases, the name of the deregistered person reportedly remains in DPAR's records but it will be crossed out in the records with a pencil or pen, and the reason for deletion will be mentioned in the notes field; DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 40-41.

²⁶ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. On difficulties encountered by refugees moving from one camp to another or moving out of a camp, see also DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 26-28.

Many Palestine refugee camps reportedly face entry and exit controls that are prone to be tightened, in particular during periods of heightened security measures, and which result in restrictions on movement in and out of camps. These restrictions on movement can reportedly limit access to employment and essential services and can also expose Palestine refugees to increased risk of arrest and detention.²⁷

3. Travelling in and out of Lebanon

Palestine refugees in Lebanon who are registered with the Lebanese authorities and who wish to travel from and to Lebanon need to acquire Palestinian travel documents issued by the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security, or General Security Office (GSO).²⁸ While such documents allow them to leave and re-enter the country, Palestine refugees from Lebanon are, however, reported to be confronted with various limitations in applying for visas to third countries due to their status as Palestine refugees.²⁹ Those who leave Lebanon without Palestinian travel documents are reportedly readmitted to the country but would be considered to have left the country illegally and would be subjected to detention (between one week to three months) and/or fines (1,250 to 7,500 Lebanese Pounds) upon return, in line with applicable legislation.³⁰

Palestine refugees who are registered with both UNRWA and DPAR can reportedly obtain travel documents valid for one, three or five years.³¹

4. Access to Services

a. Access to Employment and Livelihoods

Changes to Lebanese law in 2005 and 2010 gave Palestine refugees in Lebanon legal access to some formal employment in the private sector that had previously been limited to Lebanese nationals.³² Nevertheless, legal prohibitions reportedly persist on access for Palestine refugees to 36 liberal or syndicated professions (including in medicine, farming and fishery, and public transportation).³³ Moreover, Palestine refugees in Lebanon have reportedly only partial access to the National Social Security Fund.³⁴ In order to work, Palestine refugees in Lebanon are

²⁷ UN Development Group (UNDG), *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 62; *Joint NGO Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon at the 23rd Session of the Working Group on the UPR, November 2015 - Human Rights Violations for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1mQf4PX>, para 10.4. See also Section VI.2.

²⁸ General Directorate of General Security (GSO), *Pour les Palestiniens / Documents de Voyage et Laissez-Passer* (in French), accessed 23 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1PvXUz3>.

²⁹ Furthermore, unlike the Lebanese passport, the travel documents issued to Palestine refugees are reportedly not machine-readable and do not conform to international standards. As a result, they are not recognized by most countries. *Joint NGO Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon at the 23rd Session of the Working Group on the UPR, November 2015 - Human Rights Violations for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1mQf4PX>, para 10.2; Daily Star, *Palestinians Fear New Passport Requirements*, 25 November 2015, <http://bit.ly/1VyNDGp>.

³⁰ Law Regulating Entry to, Stay in and Exit from Lebanon, 10 July 1962 and last amendment (Law No. 173 of 14 February 2000, Article 33); International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

³¹ GSO, *Pour les Palestiniens / Documents de Voyage et Laissez-Passer* (in French), accessed 22 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1PvXUz3>. See also, *Joint NGO Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon at the 23rd Session of the Working Group on the UPR, November 2015 - Human Rights Violations for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1mQf4PX>, para 10.3.

³² ILO, *Palestinian Employment in Lebanon - Facts and Challenges*, 27 February 2014, pp. 22-23.

³³ “A 2010 labor law revision expanded employment rights and removed some restrictions on Palestinian refugees; however, this law was not fully implemented, and Palestinians remained barred from working in most skilled professions, including almost all those that require membership in a professional association”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. See also, UNRWA Labour Market Research & Development Committee, *Professions of Restricted Access for Palestine Refugees in Lebanon*, 12 November 2015, <http://bit.ly/20jg9wM>, p. 2.

³⁴ “A 2010 amendment to the social security law created a special account to provide end-of-service indemnities or severance pay to Palestinian refugees who retired or resigned. These benefits were available only to Palestinians working in the legal labor market. Palestinians did not benefit from national sickness and maternity funds or the family allowances fund. UNRWA continued to bear the cost of any medical, maternity, or family health-care expenses (excluding worker’s compensation). The law provides for benefits only from 2010 onward”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. See also, UN Development Group (UNDG), *UPR Submission of the*

required to obtain an annual work permit at no cost. However, obtaining a work permit reportedly involves a lengthy administrative process, for which the refugees depend on the goodwill of their employers, thus limiting the effectiveness of these legal changes.³⁵ According to ILO, the number of Palestine refugees holding a work permit is very low.³⁶ Most Palestine refugees in Lebanon are reported to work in menial, low-paying jobs in the informal sector.³⁷ Sources indicate that Palestine refugees regularly receive a lower salary than Lebanese nationals for the same job.³⁸ Child labour is reported to be common in and around refugee camps, with some children working as armed guards.³⁹

According to a 2010 survey by the American University in Beirut, Palestine refugees in Lebanon are highly marginalized, with two-thirds considered poor or extremely poor.⁴⁰ As of 31 December 2010, 56 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon were unemployed.⁴¹ It is generally considered likely that poverty and unemployment among Palestine refugees in Lebanon has increased, along with the overall rise in the number of poor and unemployed persons in the country, as a result of socioeconomic challenges created by the arrival of over one million refugees from Syria since 2011.⁴² Young men with limited work opportunities are reported to be likely to join militant groups.⁴³

b. Property and Housing

Around 53 per cent of the Palestine refugees registered in Lebanon are reported to live in one of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps, all of which suffer from serious overcrowding, poor housing conditions and insufficient infrastructure (in particular sewage, water and

UNCT in Lebanon, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 64; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, p. 13.

³⁵ UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 64; Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, *Human Rights Brief – Treatment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2 February 2015, <http://bit.ly/1RoQeU1>; ILO, *Palestinian Employment in Lebanon*, 27 February 2014, p. 100; BBC, *Lebanon Grants Palestinian Refugees Right to Work*, 17 August 2010, <http://bbc.in/1LgvV17>.

³⁶ DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, p. 35.

³⁷ UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 64; Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, *Human Rights Brief – Treatment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2 February 2015, <http://bit.ly/1RoQeU1>; BBC, *Lebanon Grants Palestinian Refugees Right to Work*, 17 August 2010, <http://bbc.in/1LgvV17>.

³⁸ DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 33-34, 36.

³⁹ US Department of Labor, *2013 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Lebanon*, 7 October 2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5448a62b0.html>, pp. 441, 442.

⁴⁰ In 2010, 66.4 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon were poor in 2010, and 6.6 per cent were extremely poor. The occurrence of extreme poverty among Palestine refugees was four times higher compared to the Lebanese population. General and extreme poverty was higher for refugees living inside the camps than those in gatherings. Poverty rates among Palestine refugees vary considerably among geographic locations. Poverty incidence was found highest in Tyre (79 per cent) and lowest in Central Lebanon Area (53 per cent), with the Tyre region alone accounting for more than 34 per cent of all the poor. Extreme poverty was found to be significantly higher in Saida and Tyre than in other regions (reaching almost 10 per cent), and Saida and Tyre together hosted more than 81 per cent of all extremely poor refugees; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, pp. xi, xii, 27, 29, 30. “Salvatore Lombardo, the [then] Director of UNRWA in Lebanon, told MAP [Medical Aid for Palestinians] that: ‘more than 60% of the refugee population live below the poverty line of \$6 a day, and within this there are pockets [of people who] live on less than \$2 a day’. Earlier in 2010, Lombardo told Now Lebanon online forum that in comparison with other [branches of UNRWA] ‘we have in Lebanon the highest number of what we call ‘special-hardship cases’, which is the poor[est] of the poor. We have 50,000 people in this situation, 20-30% of the [Palestinian refugee] population, who live in deplorable poverty conditions. This is the highest percentage compared to all other areas [in which we operate]’ ”; MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, p. 4.

⁴¹ AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, p. x.

⁴² “The number of poor in country is believed to have increased by 66% compared to pre-2011 figures. Similarly, there has been a significant increase in unemployment rates, with a third of Lebanon’s youth not able to find work”; UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 3. See also, World Bank, *Overview - Lebanon*, last updated 16 September 2015, <http://bit.ly/1O8NfL0>. For the number of refugees from Syria registered with UNHCR in Lebanon, see UNHCR, *Syria Regional Refugee Response – Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>.

⁴³ New York Times, *Palestinian Refugees Flee Syria to Find Poor Conditions in Lebanese Camps*, 29 May 2013, <http://nyti.ms/13ZnXtD>.

electricity).⁴⁴ The area of land allocated to the refugee camps has reportedly remained largely unchanged since 1948, despite significant population growth and the arrival of thousands of refugees from Syria.⁴⁵ This is reportedly further exacerbated by some restrictions enforced by the Lebanese authorities on the movement of building materials into Palestine refugee camps.⁴⁶ This reportedly severely limits the ability of Palestine refugees in Lebanon to improve their housing conditions, in an environment that is considered extremely congested and unhealthy environment.⁴⁷ UNRWA's Camp Improvement Initiative is reportedly affected by chronic underfunding.⁴⁸

In addition, following a change in the law in 2001,⁴⁹ Palestine refugees are reported prevented from legally acquiring, transferring or inheriting real property in Lebanon.⁵⁰

Housing opportunities for Palestine refugees are thus limited to (i) Palestine refugee camps where living conditions are reportedly substandard; (ii) renting a residence outside of Palestine refugee camps where rental rates are unaffordable for many;⁵¹ or (iii) relying on semi-legal, informal and unprotected agreements with Lebanese associates, who reportedly buy property or keep property bought pre-2001 on their behalf.⁵²

⁴⁴ UNRWA, *Where We Work – Lebanon*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon>; UN Human Rights Council, *Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with Paragraph 15 (b) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 and Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Council Resolution 16/21, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Twenty-Third Session 2-13 November 2015, Lebanon*, A/HRC/WG.6/23/LBN/231, August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1SPMSL7> [hereafter: UN Human Rights Council, *Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon*, 31 August 2015], para. 67; IRIN, *Palestinians in Lebanon - Death by Neglect*, 1 June 2015, <http://bit.ly/1WCX9Z9>. There are also 42 Palestinian informal gatherings or settlements, which were established by refugees in the early years of their displacement to Lebanon (1948-1950), or as a result of renewed displacement during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). In the wake of the Syria conflict since 2011, some 35,000 Palestinian and Syrian refugees from Syria have also taken shelter in these gatherings. These gatherings are not administered by UNRWA, but fall under the domain of the concerned municipalities. The latter, however, do not provide basic urban services, often due to a lack of resources. Dwellers in these gatherings are not entitled to UNRWA basic urban services. The 42 Palestinian refugee gatherings are considered to be among the most vulnerable host communities in Lebanon; UNDP/UN Habitat, *Improving Living Conditions in Palestinian Gatherings in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1Q8wdNh>; UN Habitat, *Profiling Deprivation: An Analysis of the Rapid Needs Assessment in Palestinian Gatherings Host Communities in Lebanon*, May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1WG35Rc> [the document provides a profile of each of the 42 gatherings at pp. 74-114].

⁴⁵ For example, the Shatila camp, which was originally built for 3,000 Palestine refugees, is reported to have a population of over 23,000; The Arab Weekly, *Rising Tensions among Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 10 July 2015, <http://bit.ly/20NrMMK>. The Burj Al-Barajneh camp reportedly hosts over 28,000 refugees on just one square kilometer of land; Fair Observer, *Deadly Summer for Palestinians in Lebanon*, 24 September 2015, <http://bit.ly/1XHwEmD>. See also, US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>; Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, *Palestinians Refugees Suffer wherever They Go*, 1 April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1WdWvRS>.

⁴⁶ UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 61.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ “Until 2001 non-Lebanese, including Palestinians, had the right to own property up to a certain size. However, in that year the Parliament adopted amendment 296 to the existing Presidential Decree 11614”; Sari Hanafi, *Palestinians in Lebanon - Status, Governance and Security*, in: Accord, Issue 24, 2012, p. 67, <http://bit.ly/1QboJwk>.

⁵⁰ Law No. 296/2001. “Palestinians who owned property prior to the law entering into force were unable to bequeath it to their heirs, and individuals who were in the process of purchasing property in installments were unable to register the property”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. See also Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), *Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon Submission to the Human Rights Council by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1OnstVP>, para. 3.2; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, p. 15.

⁵¹ “Lebanon was experiencing a shortage of affordable housing before the Syrian crisis. However, the situation has been aggravated by large numbers of refugees looking for accommodation and pushing up rents”; Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, *Palestinians Refugees Suffer wherever They Go*, 1 April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1WdWvRS>. “Outside the camps, rents have risen at an astronomical rate since early 2012 after the massive influx of Syrians and Palestinian-Syrians into Lebanon. A house that was rented for \$100 is now rented for at least \$350, according to real estate experts”; Al-Monitor, *Palestinian-Syrian Refugees Face Hardship in Lebanon*, 7 November 2014, <http://almon.co/29lo>.

⁵² “Thousands of Palestinians have tried to circumvent the law [of 2001] by registering their deeds in the name of a Lebanese friend or a Palestinian relative who holds a foreign citizenship, however a law was issued punishing with imprisonment for six months, and fining ten times the price of the property for the notary who registers properties for Palestinians, whatever the situation”; Occupied Palestine (Blog), *Law Preventing Palestinians from Owning Property*

c. Access to Healthcare

Palestine refugees reportedly do not have access to Lebanese public health services and rely mostly on UNRWA for health services,⁵³ as well as on non-profit organizations and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS).⁵⁴

UNRWA reportedly provides comprehensive primary health care such as general medical checks, preventative maternal and child care, radiology and dental care, free of charge. However, not all medical services are available at all UNRWA health clinics and as a result refugees may have to visit other clinics outside the camps, e.g. for dental treatment or laboratory tests.⁵⁵

In addition, UNRWA financially assists refugees with partial cost coverage for treatment in secondary and tertiary health care in UNRWA-contracted hospitals.⁵⁶ In light of high levels of unemployment and poverty,⁵⁷ refugees, especially those suffering from chronic diseases⁵⁸ and those in need of complex medical procedures, may be unable to bear the high costs of treatment.⁵⁹ Many refugees reportedly have to rely on assistance from relatives, friends, NGOs, or charities, sometimes running up debts.⁶⁰

Health services available to Palestine refugees in Lebanon are reported to be chronically underfunded and insufficient to cover existing and growing health needs.⁶¹ Furthermore, living conditions in the camps are reportedly linked to a multitude of physical and mental health problems among refugees.⁶² The situation of elderly persons and persons with disabilities is reportedly of particular concern.⁶³

in *Lebanon Threatens Thousands*, 25 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/1PkJhAT>. See also NRC, *No Place like Home: An Assessment of the Housing, Land and Property Rights of Palestinian Refugee Women in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon*, 2013, <http://bit.ly/1Q2QfHT>, pp. 43, 47-50.

⁵³ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, pp. xiv, 70.

⁵⁴ MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, p. 6.

⁵⁵ American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), *Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, Volume 3, June 2012, <http://bit.ly/1Ty1RcJ>, p. 9.

⁵⁶ In either PRCS or Lebanese public or private hospitals; UNRWA, *Health in Lebanon*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1oyTosT>; Al Jazeera, *Palestinians Protest Changes to UNRWA Health Policy*, 23 January 2016, <http://aje.io/3nxt>.

⁵⁷ See also Section II.4.a).

⁵⁸ A 2010 survey found that a third of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon (31 per cent) had a chronic illness, while 72 per cent of households reported having one or more chronic illness. The prevalence of chronic illnesses was most pronounced among older populations, with 83 per cent of individuals aged 55 and above reporting that they suffered from at least one chronic illness. Refugee households that were classified as “*extremely poor*” were found to suffer more chronic illnesses per household than other refugee households; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, pp. xiii, 43, 44, 63.

⁵⁹ MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, p. 10; ANERA, *Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, Volume 3, June 2012, <http://bit.ly/1Ty1RcJ>, p. 9.

⁶⁰ IRIN, *Hidden Health Crisis Facing Palestinian Refugees*, 9 October 2012, <http://bit.ly/1VwqgNx>; MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, pp. 11-12.

⁶¹ “As Salvatore Lombardo [former Director of UNRWA in Lebanon] acknowledged, ‘one of the most critical factors is that our doctors are not [physically] able to cope with the numbers of patients’. Over 1,400 Palestinian refugees were asked their opinion on UNRWA services. Almost seven out of 10 viewed the agency’s relief work as ‘insufficient’”; MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, p. 7. See also, DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 31-32.

⁶² MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, pp. 1, 4, 5. “Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have lived through several stressful events within their community: the events and legacy of the Lebanese Civil War, recent military incursions, and lingering political tensions in Lebanon over Palestinian rights. The persistence of conflict and the general malaise of poverty and poor living conditions facing many refugees likely place an undue burden of stress on many of these communities. This may be especially true of the older generation, which has lived through many conflicts in the last half century.” According to the Socio-Economic Survey conducted by the AUB in 2010, one fifth of Palestine refugees surveyed reported that they suffered from depression, anxiety or distress in the past 12 months prior to the survey; forty-one per cent of households reported at least one chronic depression case; AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, pp. xiv, 43, 44, 66.

⁶³ MAP, *Terminal Decline? Palestinian Refugee Health in Lebanon*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1KAwbk7>, p. 5.

d. Access to Education

Palestine refugees are reportedly denied access to Lebanese public schools, leaving them to pursue their education either in one of the 69 UNRWA schools (both primary and secondary) or in private schools, which are, however, beyond the financial means of most.⁶⁴ UNRWA schools are reportedly often dilapidated and face severe overcrowding.⁶⁵ Drop-out rates are reportedly high for a variety of reasons,⁶⁶ including the need to work in order to earn an income.⁶⁷ Access to higher education is reportedly limited for Palestine refugees because many cannot afford the high costs; some refugees do not see any purpose in completing an education which does not grant access to employment.⁶⁸ For Palestinians without legal status (i.e. “non-ID” Palestinians and many Palestine refugees from Syria), secondary school education is reportedly inaccessible due to their inability to take the intermediate schooling exam.⁶⁹

e. Women and Children

Difficult social conditions as a result of overcrowding, unemployment and poverty reportedly contribute to the prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV)⁷⁰ and the use of violence against children in the Palestine refugee community. Women participating in GBV sensitization sessions with UNRWA largely consider GBV to be a problem within their community.⁷¹ Nevertheless, many forms of GBV and violence against children, particularly domestic violence and corporal punishment against children, are reported to typically remain unchallenged culturally, nor are they spoken about widely; consequently, the implementation of prevention and response programmes has proven to be challenging.⁷²

Specialized service providers for responding to incidents of GBV or child abuse are reported to be scarce and their capacity limited, particularly within the camps. The lack of awareness about available services, in addition to safety concerns and fear of stigmatization, reportedly hinder access to existing services for survivors or persons at risk of abuse.⁷³ Safe shelters for survivors of or persons at risk of GBV are reportedly not available; and confidentiality is challenging, given the crowded conditions of the camps and lack of privacy within the community. Accessing services outside the camps is reportedly hampered both due to limited awareness and the strain on available services in the country.⁷⁴

⁶⁴ UNRWA is the main provider of education for Palestinian refugees. Overall enrolment rates have reportedly declined as a result of “the worsening socio-economic conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon, as well as to the fact that Palestinians, remarkably for a people once renowned for their hunger for education, no longer see the benefits of an education, given the work restrictions the Lebanese government had imposed for so long”; UNICEF, *The Situation of Palestinian Children in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon*, 2010, <http://uni.cf/1OnvsgZ>, p. 83.

⁶⁵ International Business Times, *Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugees Protest against UNRWA in Wake of Growing Conspiracies around Healthcare Cuts*, 19 January 2016, <http://bit.ly/1ZKlzpA>; UNICEF, *The Situation of Palestinian Children in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon*, 2010, <http://uni.cf/1OnvsgZ>, p. 84.

⁶⁶ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>; DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, p. 30; UNICEF, *The Situation of Palestinian Children in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon*, 2010, <http://uni.cf/1OnvsgZ>, p. 83.

⁶⁷ Geneva Call, *Study: Children at Risk in the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1OngBTZ>, pp. 9, 23; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>.

⁶⁸ DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, p. 30. See also above Section II.4.a).

⁶⁹ Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, *Palestinians Refugees Suffer Wherever They Go*, 1 April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1WdWvRS>.

⁷⁰ Amnesty International, *‘I Want a Safe Place’: Refugee Women from Syria Uprooted and Unprotected in Lebanon*, MDE 18/3210/2016, 2 February 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56b1b0fa4.html> [hereafter: Amnesty International, *Refugee Women from Syria Uprooted and Unprotected in Lebanon*, 2 February 2016], p. 45.

⁷¹ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

⁷² UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, GBV Information Sensitization Sessions, conducted in 2015 across Lebanon.

⁷³ Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon - Child Protection Sector, *Quarterly Dashboard, Jan - Mar 2015*, 31 March 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PgvNpO>. See also, Amnesty International, *Refugee Women from Syria Uprooted and Unprotected in Lebanon*, 2 February 2016, pp. 54-55.

⁷⁴ Information provided by UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, January 2016.

f. Palestine Refugees with Specific Vulnerabilities

One in ten Palestinian households in Lebanon is reported to have at least one family member with a disability.⁷⁵ According to reports, there is a strong correlation between disability and poverty in Palestinian communities in Lebanon.⁷⁶ Their reported social marginalization is reportedly further exacerbated by the limited access to and limited availability of specialized rehabilitation services, as well as the general lack of awareness in relation to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities in Lebanon.⁷⁷ Women, children and elderly persons with disabilities are reported to be particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation and violence. Furthermore, Palestine refugees and other non-nationals are not granted access to specialized services on the same basis as Lebanese nationals.⁷⁸

III. NON-REGISTERED PALESTINIANS

An estimated 35,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with the DPAR, but not with UNRWA.⁷⁹ These persons fall outside UNRWA's mandate because they left Palestine after 1948; because they took refuge outside UNRWA areas of operations prior to coming to Lebanon; because they left after 1948; or because they did not otherwise meet UNRWA's eligibility criteria.⁸⁰ UNRWA started assisting this non-registered refugee population as of January 2004.⁸¹

Non-registered Palestinians are reportedly granted the same residency permits afforded to those who are registered with UNRWA;⁸² however, they are issued a different travel document (*Laissez Passer*), valid for one year and renewable three times.⁸³

IV. "NON-ID" PALESTINIANS

There are an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 "non-ID" Palestinians in Lebanon.⁸⁴ They arrived in Lebanon starting in the 1960s and do not hold any valid formal identification documents.⁸⁵ As

⁷⁵ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, p. 32. Furthermore, 9.2 per cent of special hardship cases are households with disabled family members; UNRWA, *RSSD Identification, Verification and Targeting of Persons with Disability Report*, December 2013, unpublished.

⁷⁶ AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, p. 35.

⁷⁷ Arab NGO Network for Development, *The Universal Periodic Review, Lebanon 2015, Civil Society Reports*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1QmokTP>, pp. 107-113.

⁷⁸ Lebanese Law 220 of 2000 defines the rights of people with disabilities in the fields of education, rehabilitation, employment, and access to services. Article 4 of the law is the legal basis for the disability identification card, which enables a person with disabilities to benefit from targeted support and benefits. The law does not specifically exclude Palestinians with a disability; however, the Lebanese authorities reportedly do not issue the disability identification card to Palestine refugees; *Joint NGO Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon at the 23rd Session of the Working Group on the UPR, November 2015 - Human Rights Violations for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1mQf4PX>, paras 14.2 and 14.6; Arab NGO Network for Development, *The Universal Periodic Review, Lebanon 2015, Civil Society Reports*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1QmokTP>, pp. 107-113; ILO, *Emerging Good Practices Related to the Training and Job Placement of Persons with Disabilities in Lebanon*, 2013, <http://bit.ly/1VBBobW>.

⁷⁹ AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, p. 4; DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, p. 16.

⁸⁰ Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 2; DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, p. 16.

⁸¹ "The explanation for this extension of services was that non-registered refugees are also Palestinians who fled their homeland and are not offered any assistance by the Lebanese government"; DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, p. 17. On access and availability of services, see Section II.4.

⁸² See Section II.1.

⁸³ BADIL, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons*, 4 June 2007, <http://bit.ly/1Qa86Dc>, p. 127; Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 3; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Lebanon: Requirements and Procedures for a Palestinian Refugee to Obtain a Travel Document; whether the Applicant is Screened for Criminal Charges (2005-February 2014) [LBN104772.E]*, 19 February 2014, <http://bit.ly/23YMEox>.

⁸⁴ Lebanese Republic/Presidency of the Council of Ministers/Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, *Non-IDs*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1QPZ6zZ>; DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, p. 17.

⁸⁵ "(...) the Non-ID refugees' category does not constitute a homogenous group. The majority of this category members can be classified into several sub-categories, including:

they are neither registered with UNRWA⁸⁶ in Lebanon nor with the Lebanese authorities, they reportedly do not have a valid legal status in the country.⁸⁷ Children born to “non-ID” Palestinian fathers are reportedly often not registered with UNRWA nor do they receive any identity documents from the Lebanese government: they become “non-IDs” as well.⁸⁸ Without valid documentation and legal status, “non-ID” Palestinians reportedly face severe restrictions on their right to freedom of movement and access to services,⁸⁹ risk being arrested and detained,⁹⁰ and are unable to complete civil registration procedures for vital events such as birth, marriage, divorce and death.⁹¹ UNRWA provides primary health care, education, and vocational training services to undocumented Palestinians, despite the fact that they are not registered with the agency.⁹²

The GSO has, according to reports, intermittently issued temporary identity cards to “non-ID” Palestinians since 2008.⁹³ However, these Special Identification Cards (SICs) only serve as

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1. *Palestinians holding identity cards, valid or expired, issued by Jordanian authorities, but they are unable for various reasons to return to the Hashemite Kingdom.*
 2. *Palestinians from the Gaza Strip with identity documents issued by the Egyptian authorities, who are not allowed to stay in Egypt, as well as they cannot return to the Gaza Strip.*
 3. *Palestinians carry identification documents issued by the Iraqi authorities have left Iraq because of the violence and persecution they had suffered there.*
 4. *Palestinians expelled by Israel from the occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza) and does not allow them to return thereto.*
 5. *and others ...”*

Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 5.

⁸⁶ UNRWA’s consolidated eligibility and registration instructions define Palestine refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of 1st June 1946 to 15th May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. (...) descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are [also] eligible for registration”; UNRWA, *Consolidated Eligibility and Registration Instructions (CERI)*, 2009, <http://bit.ly/1NZmXZi>, p. 3.

⁸⁷ DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, p. 17.

⁸⁸ Jennifer Ibrahim, *The Discrimination against Palestinian Refugees Living in Lebanon*, in: *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol 15 No. 1 & 2, 2008, <http://bit.ly/1Q9dJj9>.

⁸⁹ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015,

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>; Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 6.

⁹⁰ “(...) non-ID Palestinians (...) become prisoners inside the camp, fearing they would be arrested upon leaving it, or would be unable to return to it once they leave”; Mariam A. Itani and Mo’in Manna’, *The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee*, Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2010, ISBN 978-9953-500-54-6, p. 63. “In practice, non-ID refugees exit the camps, but may be stopped and arrested. Several families reported that one of the members (father/son – usually a male) had been arrested or was currently under arrest because he lacked valid documentation. According to interviewed non-ID refugees, those who are arrested are imprisoned in their region or sent to the Roumieh jail (in Mount Lebanon) for up to three months”; DRC, *Situation of Non-ID Palestinian Refugees – Lebanon*, September 2007, p. 25. See also pp. 24, 33 and 34 of the same report. “They are unable to move outside camps for fear of being arrested”; Cynthia Petrigh, *No Freedom, no Future: Undocumented Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, *Forced Migration Review*, No. 26, August 2006, <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR26/FMR2606.pdf>, p. 15 See also, Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 6; IRIN, *Palestinians Without Papers Could soon Get IDs*, 11 March 2008, <http://bit.ly/1mV7qE3>; Frontiers Association, *Falling through the Cracks: Legal and Practical Gaps in Palestinian Refugee Status*, August 2005, p. 19.

⁹¹ “The [UN] country team noted that an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Palestine refugees continued to live in Lebanon without any formal valid identification, resulting in restrictions of movement, risk of arrest and difficulties completing civil registration”; UN Human Rights Council, *Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon*, 31 August 2015, para. 52. “They are considered to be illegal residents and lack identity documents, which puts severe restrictions on their freedom of movement because documentation is required at the checkpoints in and out of the camps and around the country. Consequently, many fear they will be arrested upon leaving the camps and cannot work. Lack of documentation also means that having marriages registered by the government is extremely difficult”; Jennifer Ibrahim, *The Discrimination against Palestinian Refugees Living in Lebanon*, in: *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol 15 No. 1 & 2, 2008, <http://bit.ly/1Q9dJj9>. See also, *Joint NGO Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon at the 23rd Session of the Working Group on the UPR, November 2015 - Human Rights Violations for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1mQf4PX>, para. 9.2.

⁹² US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>. On access and availability of services, see also Section II.4.

⁹³ “The Lebanese authorities have issued special ID cards to more than 1,800 such persons since 2008, however relatively few of these remain valid. The failure of persons to renew or apply for these ID scan be attributed to the limited validity, the lack of its widespread formal recognition by Lebanese authorities, the complex application process and the high rate of rejections”; UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 61. See also, Amnesty International, *Lebanon: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review Ninth Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council: November-December 2010*, 12 April 2010, MDE 18/002/2010, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c7f82a62.html>, p. 5.

proof of identity and the holder cannot register vital events such as births, deaths, marriages and divorces,⁹⁴ nor be recognized as a refugee in Lebanon.⁹⁵ Moreover, very few “non-ID” Palestinians are reportedly able to obtain and maintain a valid card, which further hinders its effectiveness.⁹⁶ The GSO reportedly does not issue SICs to Palestine refugees who are holding passports issued by the Palestinian Authority, or Egyptian travel documents or Jordanian passports, regardless of whether these documents are still valid, and without taking into account whether the holder might be able to renew those documents and/or enter the country that issued the travel document.⁹⁷ Individuals who are in the possession of such documents are reportedly asked to apply for a residency permit on the same basis as other foreigners living in Lebanon, which incurs annual costs.⁹⁸ However, many “non-ID” Palestinians reportedly face difficulties in renewing expired Palestinian Authority or Egyptian travel documents, further preventing them from applying for regular residency permits with the Lebanese authorities.⁹⁹ Furthermore, it has been reported that not all members of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) are familiar with SICs, which can be problematic at checkpoints and thus hinder freedom of movement within Lebanon.¹⁰⁰

V. PALESTINE REFUGEES FROM SYRIA IN LEBANON

The on-going conflict in Syria has forced many Palestine refugees to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, including in Lebanon. UNRWA is working to address their humanitarian needs, including by providing education, health care, shelter and other assistance. As of December 2015, approximately half of the more than 42,000 Palestine refugees from Syria present in Lebanon were living in one of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, with the other half living outside of camps. Palestine refugees from Syria are reportedly at risk of detention and fines, and/or forcible return to Syria due to their lack of legal status in Lebanon.

1. Access to Territory

At the onset of the conflict in Syria, it was reported that Palestine refugees from Syria were initially allowed entry into Lebanon using their ID cards or travel documents issued by the relevant Syrian authorities, provided they had obtained a Syrian exit visa in advance.¹⁰¹ However, since August 2013, entry restrictions were reportedly introduced for Palestinian refugees from Syria and individuals started being screened for entry at the border.¹⁰² The restrictions reportedly resulted in the denial of entry of some Palestine refugees from Syria between August 2013 and April 2014.¹⁰³

⁹⁴ “An unknown number of Palestinian refugees continued to reside in Lebanon without an official ID card, leaving them with even fewer rights. They remained, for example, unable to register marriages, births and deaths”; Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Annual Report 2012 - Lebanon*, 24 May 2012, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fbc392cc.html>. See also, Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 6.

⁹⁵ Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 8.

⁹⁶ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

⁹⁷ Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 8.

⁹⁸ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

⁹⁹ In addition, the GSO can reportedly refuse to issue a SIC for “reasons often related to security”; Aidoun, *Undocumented Palestinians in Lebanon*, 2014, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ Amnesty International, *Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review – Ninth Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, November-December 2010*, p. 5.

¹⁰¹ “Even prior to the May 2014 changes in policy, Palestinian refugees from Syria faced different conditions for entry into Lebanon, including a requirement that they first obtain permission to exit Syria from the Syrian authorities, for which they had to pay”; Amnesty International, *Denied Refuge: Palestinians from Syria Seeking Safety in Lebanon*, 1 July 2014, MDE 18/002/2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabdd14.html> [hereafter: Amnesty International, *Denied Refuge*, 1 July 2014], p. 7.

¹⁰² UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 21, 9 August 2013, <http://bit.ly/1Xdlypb>; Amnesty International, *Left Out in the Cold: Syrian Refugees Abandoned by the International Community*, 5 December 2014, MDE 24/047/2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5486fa094.html>, p. 16.

¹⁰³ Amnesty International, *Denied Refuge*, 1 July 2014, pp. 7, 11.

Since May 2014, additional entry restrictions have reportedly been imposed as the Ministry of Interior announced a stop to the issuance of visas for Palestine refugees from Syria at the border.¹⁰⁴ Since then, entry at the border is reportedly only granted with either a verified embassy appointment in Lebanon, or a flight ticket and visa to a third country: conditions that the majority of Palestine refugees from Syria are unable to meet.¹⁰⁵ Individuals who are able to meet these conditions are reportedly usually only issued with a 24-hour transit visa.¹⁰⁶ In addition, limited numbers of Palestine refugees from Syria are reportedly able to secure a visa to enter Lebanon by obtaining prior approval from GSO. This reportedly requires a sponsor in Lebanon and cannot be processed at border posts, but has to be done in Syria prior to travelling.¹⁰⁷ Access to Lebanon for “humanitarian reasons” or in order to seek international protection is reportedly not possible.¹⁰⁸

Some Palestine refugees from Syria have reportedly sought to enter Lebanon through irregular border crossings, placing them at risk of exploitation and abuse, in particular due to the fear of arrest and/or deportation.¹⁰⁹ Under current regulations, irregular entry into Lebanon is reported to be an obstacle to regularizing one’s legal status at a later time.

2. Legal Status

In February 2013, a circular issued by the Directorate General of General Security stipulated that Palestine refugees from Syria could obtain residency permits valid for three months and renewable for up to 12 months at no cost, upon entry into the country.¹¹⁰ After this 12-month period, a fee of USD 200 per person was required to extend legal residency.¹¹¹ These costs were reported to be prohibitive and the majority of Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly did not renew their documents. As a consequence, they were considered by the authorities to be present in Lebanon illegally.¹¹² Throughout 2014, the Ministry of Interior reportedly issued

¹⁰⁴ “New measures mean Palestinians fleeing Syria will not be given visas at the border, while those who are already in the country will not have their visas renewed. In a statement posted on his Facebook page Thursday, Interior Minister Nohad al-Mashnuq said no visas will be issued at the main Masnaa border crossing. Palestinians living in Syria who wish to enter Lebanon must first request a visa at the Lebanese embassy in Damascus. The request will be processed by the Lebanese General Security agency. Only those with a residence permit in Lebanon will be admitted, the minister said. Mashnuq also announced that the two-week visas previously granted to Palestinians fleeing Syria would no longer be renewable”; AFP, *Lebanon All but Bars Palestinians Fleeing Syria*, 9 May 2014, <https://shar.es/14wJup>. See also, BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, Al-Majdal, Issue No. 56, Autumn 2014, <http://bit.ly/1V3kkeM> [hereafter: BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, 2014]; Amnesty International, *Denied Refugee: Palestinians from Syria Seeking Safety in Lebanon*, 1 July 2014; UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 35, 31 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1SYD53U>; Daily Star, *Machnouk: New Entry Rules for Palestinians from Syria*, 9 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1Ww4wpV>.

¹⁰⁵ Amnesty International, *Lebanon - Amnesty International Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review 23rd Session of the UPR Working Group, 2-13 November 2015*, March 2015, <http://bit.ly/1L2MHt6>, p. 3; Amnesty International, *Lebanon: New Entry Requirements for Syrians likely to Block Would-Be Refugees*, 6 January 2015, <http://bit.ly/1IIm9fB>; UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 36, 30 June 2014, <http://bit.ly/1nSlbUE>, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 36, 30 June 2014, <http://bit.ly/1nSlbUE>, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

¹⁰⁸ While Syrian nationals are subject to entry restrictions since January 2015, tighter conditions are applied to Palestine refugees from Syria. While Syrian nationals can, theoretically, avail themselves of a formal process with the authorities permitting entry for ‘humanitarian exceptions’, this option is not available to Palestine refugees from Syria; Amnesty International, *Lebanon - Amnesty International Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review 23rd Session of the UPR Working Group, 2-13 November 2015*, March 2015, <http://bit.ly/1L2MHt6>, p. 3; Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria: Challenges and Consequences of Maintaining Legal Stay in Beirut and Mount Lebanon*, June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cab8c4.html> [hereafter: NRC/IDMC, *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria*, June 2015], p. 14; BBC, *Syrians Entering Lebanon Face New Restrictions*, 5 January 2015, <http://bbc.in/14pdjqp>.

¹⁰⁹ Amnesty International, *Denied Refugee*, 1 July 2014, pp. 15-17.

¹¹⁰ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 21, 9 August 2013, <http://bit.ly/1Xdlypb>.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 65; UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, p. 6. See also, Dalia Aranki and Olivia Kalis, *Limited Legal Status for Refugees from Syria in Lebanon*, Forced Migration Review, No. 47, September 2014, <http://www.fmreview.org/syria/aranki-kalis> [hereafter:

several circulars on the conditions for renewing residency permits for Palestine refugees from Syria, including restrictions on the number of renewals and the maximum period of stay, as well as on the issuance of cost-free residency permits during a short period of time.¹¹³ Such circulars were reportedly applied inconsistently throughout the country and many Palestine refugees from Syria did not approach the GSO for fear of arrest and/or deportation or due to the length and cost of the process.¹¹⁴

Since January 2015, the GSO has reportedly issued several consecutive internal memos enabling Palestine refugees from Syria to renew their legal residency documents for three months¹¹⁵ upon payment of outstanding fees of USD 200 per person per year.¹¹⁶ The additional terms and conditions for these renewal procedures were not published until late October 2015, and were reportedly applied inconsistently across the country.¹¹⁷ Starting in October 2015, successive memos have reportedly been issued publicly, which allowed Palestine refugees to renew their visas, free of charge, within a specified period; however the validity of these visas is reportedly often very limited (between one and three months in practice); by early 2016 it was unclear whether these measures would continue.¹¹⁸

Although only three per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon are reported to have entered the country in an irregular manner, by mid-2014 more than 50 per cent of the Palestine refugees from Syria did reportedly not hold a valid visa in Lebanon. This indicates that most of them are unable to regularize their stay following their arrival.¹¹⁹ The lack of legal status is in turn reported to restrict refugees' access to basic services, employment, civil documentation, and justice.¹²⁰

3. Civil Registration and Access to Documentation

A valid legal status is a prerequisite for most civil registration processes in Lebanon such as the registration of births and marriages. Difficulties in obtaining legal residency documents are reported to have a wide-reaching impact on Palestine refugees from Syria. Of particular concern is the registration of new-borns, marriages and divorces.¹²¹ According to reports, the majority of children born in Lebanon to parents who are Palestine refugees from Syria will

Dalia Aranki and Olivia Kalis, *Limited Legal Status for Refugees from Syria in Lebanon*, September 2014]; BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, 2014.

¹¹³ See, e.g., UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 35, 31 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1SYD53U>; UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 39, 30 September 2014, <http://bit.ly/1NZnTNe>.

¹¹⁴ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 42, 1 January – 28 February 2015, <http://bit.ly/1SaDVMc>.

¹¹⁵ NRC/IDMC, *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria*, June 2015, p. 6 and FN 7.

¹¹⁶ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 45, 1 July - 30 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1SDEezz>.

¹¹⁷ “The situation for PRS is even less clear [compared to the situation of Syrian refugees], with some indication that they may renew their residency in theory but, in practice, there are very few instances where PRS are able to do this. With no officially published regulations regarding the procedures for renewal of their residency visas, it is difficult to understand under what circumstances PRS may renew their residency in Lebanon”; NRC/IDMC, *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria*, June 2015, p. 15. See also p. 8 of the same report. See also, Amnesty International, *Refugee Women from Syria Uprooted and Unprotected in Lebanon*, 2 February 2016, p. 25.

¹¹⁸ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

¹¹⁹ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, pp. 6, 13. “If Lebanon does not allow PRS to access ways to obtain valid residency, NRC anticipates that most PRS in Lebanon already have or will have limited legal status by the end of June 2015”; NRC, *Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon Submission to the Human Rights Council by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1OnstVP>, para. 1.3.

¹²⁰ Dalia Aranki and Olivia Kalis, *Limited Legal Status for Refugees from Syria in Lebanon*, September 2014.

¹²¹ UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 65; UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 45, 1 July - 30 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1SDEezz>; BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, 2014.

unlikely be able to complete all the necessary steps for birth registration with the Lebanese authorities, raising concerns about the emergence of a new undocumented population.¹²²

4. Restrictions on Freedom of Movement, Risk of Detention and Deportation

The lack of legal status and valid documentation reportedly exposes Palestine refugees from Syria to the risk of arrest, temporary detention and departure orders.¹²³ Male adults are reported to be particularly at risk of being detained, and to have their documents confiscated at checkpoints within Lebanon or when crossing borders between Lebanon and Syria.¹²⁴ For fear of arrest and deportation, Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly feel compelled to limit their movements.¹²⁵ Movement in and out of camps (notably Nahr El-Bared Camp, Ein El-Hilweh and the camps in Tyre Area) is reportedly particularly restricted without valid documentation.¹²⁶

In May 2014, around 40 Palestine refugees from Syria were reportedly arrested at Beirut International Airport after they tried to leave the country with allegedly falsified documents; they were reportedly forcibly returned to Syria.¹²⁷

Palestine refugees from Syria who have left Lebanon are, according to reports, generally not readmitted to Lebanon.¹²⁸

5. Access to Services

a. Overview

Palestine refugees from Syria have access to UNRWA schools, health clinics and hospitalization through referrals, as well as humanitarian assistance.¹²⁹ However, their lack of legal status and up-to-date civil registration documents as well as restrictions on movement, reportedly negatively impacts access to services.¹³⁰ A vulnerability assessment conducted by UNRWA in July 2014 showed that 95 per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria were dependent on UNRWA cash assistance to cover expenses related to food and housing.¹³¹ However, as a result of insufficient funding for UNRWA's activities in Lebanon, cash assistance for housing reportedly had to be suspended in July 2015, exacerbating refugees' vulnerability.¹³² Palestine refugees from Syria are reportedly at risk of forcible eviction,

¹²² UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 66; NRC, *The Challenges of Birth Registration in Lebanon for Refugees from Syria*, January 2015, <http://bit.ly/1T809OW>.

¹²³ "Many of those without regular status are issued with 'departure orders' by the Lebanese authorities and told to leave before certain date. While these are not being actively enforced, detention is a risk and many PRS report fear of deportation or limiting their movement citing fear of detention"; UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 65. See also, NRC/IDMC, *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria*, June 2015, pp. 6, 7, 13; UNRWA, *Lack of Funds Forces UNRWA to Suspend Cash Assistance for Housing for Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon*, 22 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1nSjztZ>.

¹²⁴ NRC/IDMC, *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria*, June 2015, p. 22.

¹²⁵ NRC/IDMC, *Legal Status of Refugees from Syria*, June 2015, p. 28; Dalia Aranki and Olivia Kalis, *Limited Legal Status for Refugees from Syria in Lebanon*, September 2014; BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, 2014.

¹²⁶ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon - In a State of Uncertainty*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PgXZNX> [hereafter: UNRWA, *In a State of Uncertainty*, 2015].

¹²⁷ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 35, 31 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1SYD53U>. See also BBC, *Lebanon 'Expels' Palestinian Refugees Fleeing Syria*, 6 May 2014, <http://bbc.in/1RoPhuY>; Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Lebanon: Palestinians Barred, Sent to Syria*, 5 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1SDC17f>. See also, NOW, *Palestinians in Lebanon Think of "Emigration"*, 23 September 2015, <http://mme.cm/179U00>.

¹²⁸ BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, 2014.

¹²⁹ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>.

¹³⁰ UNRWA, *2015 Syria Crisis Response Progress Report*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1i5jtvS>, p. 12; UNRWA, *In a State of Uncertainty*, 2015; BADIL, *Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: An Overview*, 2014.

¹³¹ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 43, March - April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1nS17EJ>.

¹³² Since February 2014, UNRWA has been distributing monthly cash assistance to Palestine refugee families from Syria for food and housing. However, as of July 2015, housing assistance, in the amount of USD 100 per family and per month, had to be suspended due to the funding challenges faced by UNRWA; UNRWA, *Lack of Funds Forces*

dropping out of school, pressure to seek high-risk employment, GBV, reduced ability to maintain legal status and increased likelihood of unsafe return to Syria or dangerous onward movement to Europe.¹³³ Palestine refugees from Syria have reportedly repeatedly protested against insufficient access to services.¹³⁴

b. Access to Employment and Livelihoods

According to an UNRWA report on the vulnerability of Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon dated October 2015, they have extremely limited access to work opportunities in the informal sector coupled with high expenditures on food and shelter. More than 90 per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly lack food or the money needed to feed their family. One in ten families who experienced lack of food (or lack of money for food) reported that at least one member in the family had spent days without eating.¹³⁵ More than three-quarters of Palestine refugees from Syria reported being indebted, with almost one in four having incurred debts exceeding USD 600.¹³⁶ Female-headed Palestine refugee families from Syria are reported to face particularly challenging livelihood conditions. Four out of five female-headed families reported that nobody in the family was working.¹³⁷ For those families where at least one family member was working, roughly nine jobs out of ten were temporary jobs, while only eight per cent of the workers held a permanent job.¹³⁸

c. Housing

One of the most immediate concerns for Palestine refugees from Syria is reported to be shelter, as they are faced with an acute housing shortage and prohibitively high rental prices.¹³⁹ The average monthly rent for families from Syria amounts to USD 207 inside refugee camps and USD 303 for those living outside camps.¹⁴⁰ However, more than half of the families surveyed in mid-2014 reported not to have any family members working during the month preceding the assessment.¹⁴¹ Nearly 60 per cent of Palestine refugee families from Syria reportedly live in overcrowded conditions with families sharing accommodation with one or more families,¹⁴² while at least one in ten families reportedly live in extremely crowded conditions with available living space less than 3.5 m² (the minimum living space required for healthy living) per person.¹⁴³ Three and a half per cent of Palestine refugees from Syria reportedly live in particularly vulnerable conditions in unfinished shelters, tents, huts or barracks.¹⁴⁴

UNRWA to Suspend Cash Assistance for Housing for Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, 22 May 2014, <http://bit.ly/1nSjztZ>. See also Al-Monitor, *Palestinian-Syrian Refugees Face Hardship in Lebanon*, 7 November 2014, <http://almon.co/29lo>.

¹³³ UNRWA, *2015 Syria Crisis Response Progress Report*, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1i5jtvS>, p. 12. See also, Al-Monitor, *Palestinian-Syrian Refugees Face Hardship in Lebanon*, 7 November 2014, <http://almon.co/29lo>.

¹³⁴ Jerusalem Post, *Palestinians in Lebanon Revolt over Reduction of UNRWA Services*, 14 January 2016, <http://bit.ly/1T6QMh9>; UNRWA, *Lack of Funds Forces UNRWA to Suspend Cash Assistance for Palestine Refugees from Syria in Lebanon*, 22 May 2015, <http://bit.ly/1nSjztZ>; The Daily Star, *Palestinian Refugees across Lebanon Protest UNRWA Aid Cuts*, 16 July 2015, <http://bit.ly/20EhXG5>.

¹³⁵ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, p. 20.

¹³⁶ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, p. 17.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ UNRWA, *PRS in Lebanon*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon>.

¹⁴⁰ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, pp. 7, 24.

¹⁴¹ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, p. 15.

¹⁴² UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, p. 11.

¹⁴³ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, pp. 7, 23.

¹⁴⁴ UNRWA, *Profiling the Vulnerability of Palestine Refugees from Syria Living in Lebanon*, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PBn8zb>, pp. 7, 22.

d. Access to Healthcare

Camp-based Palestine refugees from Syria in need of secondary and tertiary health-care may reportedly face difficulties in accessing UNRWA-contracted hospitals located outside Palestine refugee camps, due to the lack of valid residency permits, associated restrictions on their freedom of movement and the risk of arrest and detention at checkpoints.¹⁴⁵

e. Access to Education

While Palestine refugee children from Syria have, in principle, access to UNRWA primary and secondary education, the lack of regular legal status reportedly means that they are unable to register for official school exams and thus to obtain official school certificates (Brevet and Baccalaureate certificates).¹⁴⁶ Without the prospects of obtaining official school certificates, many reportedly drop out of school.¹⁴⁷

VI. PALESTINE REFUGEE CAMPS

1. Security Conditions

While Palestinians residing outside refugee camps rely on the Internal Security Forces (ISF) for security, protection or law enforcement issues,¹⁴⁸ those living in one of the 12 recognized refugee camps are subject to the exercise of control at the hands of Palestinian factions, with different camps often ruled by different factions.¹⁴⁹ Based on a historical and now defunct arrangement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanon authorities, the latter are reported to generally abstain from exercising government control in refugee camps.¹⁵⁰ Lebanese security forces reportedly control the camp entrances, checking vehicles and identities at armed checkpoints.¹⁵¹ It is reported that “[I]n the camps, all the Palestinian factions, including Leftist groups, Islamist factions, or Fatah, have weaponry and militiamen at their disposal, and have their own security apparatus.”¹⁵² Political divisions and competition over influence among armed factions in the camps reportedly result in

¹⁴⁵ UNRWA, *In a State of Uncertainty*, 2015.

¹⁴⁶ UNDG, *UPR Submission of the UNCT in Lebanon*, November 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabfaf4.html>, para. 66.

¹⁴⁷ UNRWA, *UNRWA Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon*, Issue 43, March - April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1nS17E1>.

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, pp. ii, 2-3, 8-20. On the availability of protection for Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese authorities, see DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 7-14.

¹⁴⁹ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>; Al Jazeera, *Palestinians Desperate to Flee Lebanon Refugee Camp*, 5 April 2015, <http://aje.io/pzw2>; Haaretz, *Palestinians in Mideast Find Their Position More Precarious in Wake of Syria War*, 27 March 2015, <http://bit.ly/1Pns0Hc>. On the availability of protection for Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese authorities, see DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, p. 17; Sari Hanafi, *Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: Laboratories of State-in-the-Making, Discipline and Islamist Radicalism*, in: Ronit Lentin, *Thinking Palestine*. London: Zed Books (2008): 82-100, <http://bit.ly/1SYzvH2>, p. 90.

¹⁵⁰ “(...) the Lebanese army has to abide by an unwritten rule from the Cairo agreement (1969) signed between PLO and Lebanese State, saying that Palestinians are the sole responsible for the security in the camps, where the Lebanese armed forces should be proscribed. This agreement, which was nevertheless abrogated by Lebanese Parliament May, 21, 1987, is still applied tacitly, except for Nahr Bared”; Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015. See also, AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, 31 December 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PDgESC>, pp. 5-6; Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, *Palestinian Refugees Camps in Lebanon Summary and Proposals*, undated, <http://bit.ly/1ok5F4C>, pp. 2-3. On the security arrangements in the Nahr El-Bared camp, see below Section VI.4.

¹⁵¹ Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015; Al Jazeera, *Palestinians Desperate to Flee Lebanon Refugee Camp*, 5 April 2015, <http://aje.io/pzw2>. “JS12 [joint NGO submission to the UPR] reported that the refugee camps in southern Lebanon are fenced with barbed wire and military checkpoints, hindering the freedom of movement of Palestine refugees. Checkpoints were established around camps in the southern suburbs of Beirut and at the camps’ entrance in northern Lebanon”; UN Human Rights Council, *Summary Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (c) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 and Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Council Resolution 16/21*, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Twenty Third Session 2–13 November 2015, A/HRC/WG.6/23/LBN/3, 10 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1RfGJ7D>, para. 53.

¹⁵² Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015.

political killings¹⁵³ and sporadic factional fighting among both Palestinian and non-Palestinian groups, often affecting the civilian population.¹⁵⁴ Inter-Lebanese conflict is reported to occasionally seep into Palestinian refugee camps as (Lebanese) armed militants seek a haven in the camps,¹⁵⁵ or collaborate with Palestinian armed factions.¹⁵⁶ There are also reported concerns over infiltration of the camps by radical Islamist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Ash-Sham (ISIS) and Al-Qa'eda.¹⁵⁷ Finally, criminal networks involved in drug smuggling, trafficking of weapons and prostitution further reportedly add to insecurity.¹⁵⁸ The 2015 UNRWA-AUB socio-economic survey found that the majority of both Palestine refugees in Lebanon (61 per cent) and Palestine refugees from Syria (57 per cent) reported feeling insecure in the camps due to their physical and social environment.¹⁵⁹

2. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

According to reports, both state security forces and Palestinian factions subject Palestinian refugees to arbitrary arrest and detention, with the latter reported to be operating their own detention facilities in the refugee camps.¹⁶⁰ Palestinian factions in the refugee camps reportedly run their own system of justice which functions outside of state control.¹⁶¹

The Committee against Torture (CAT) found that torture was a pervasive practice that was routinely used by the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, most often in pre-trial detention. Evidence gathered throughout the country indicated a clear pattern of widespread torture and ill-treatment of suspects in custody.¹⁶² Human rights and civil society actors

¹⁵³ “Coordinating with other hardline Salafist groups, such as the Muslim Youth and Fatah al-Islam, Jund al-Sham over the past year has assassinated dozens of Palestinians - particularly those with political connections to the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, which has been fighting alongside the Assad government in neighbouring Syria. Most recently, in late July [2015], a sniper shot and killed Fatah military leader Talal al-Balawneh (also known as Talal al-Ourdouni) as he drove his car through the [Ein El-Hilweh] camp; Al Jazeera, *Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilweh*, 31 August 2015, <http://aje.io/hpvn>. See also, Electronic Intifada, *Double Displacement: Palestinians Flee Violence in Syria, then Lebanon*, 3 September 2015, <http://bit.ly/1WgkaRw>; Al Monitor, *Hamas Working to Lower Tensions in Lebanese Camps*, 15 June 2015, <http://almon.co/2g9u>.

¹⁵⁴ Al-Monitor, *Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon Becomes Battlefield for Fatah-Islamist Conflict*, 4 September 2015, <http://almon.co/2i9b>; Haaretz, *Palestinians in Mideast Find Their Position More Precarious in Wake of Syria War*, 27 March 2015; Al Monitor, *Palestinian Factions Maintain Fragile Stability in Sidon Camp*, 4 March 2015, <http://almon.co/2do8>; ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, pp. 12, 22, 27, 31.

¹⁵⁵ Al-Monitor, *Ain Al-Hilweh Refuge for Militants, Fugitives*, 11 December 2014, <http://almon.co/2b75>; BBC, *Profile: Fatah al-Islam*, 15 August 2010, <http://bbc.in/1SKmXVm>.

¹⁵⁶ “Marwan Issa, a Lebanese member of the Hezbollah-backed Resistance Brigades, was found dead in the boot of a car in Ain al-Hilweh last April. He is believed to have been slain by Salafist groups who were angry about coordination between local groups and Hezbollah, and wanted to dissuade the Palestinian Joint Security Forces from deploying troops in the Jund al-Sham-controlled Tawari neighbourhood of the camp”; Al Jazeera, *Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilweh*, 31 August 2015, <http://aje.io/hpvn>. See also Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015; Al Monitor, *Hamas Working to Lower Tensions in Lebanese Camps*, 15 June 2015, <http://almon.co/2g9u>.

¹⁵⁷ Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015; Al Monitor, *Hamas Working to Lower Tensions in Lebanese Camps*, 15 June 2015, <http://almon.co/2g9u>; Haaretz, *Palestinians in Mideast Find Their Position More Precarious in Wake of Syria War*, 27 March 2015, <http://bit.ly/1Pns0Hc>; Al Monitor, *Palestinian Factions Maintain Fragile Stability in Sidon Camp*, 4 March 2015, <http://almon.co/2do8>.

¹⁵⁸ Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *A Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon*, October 2015.

¹⁵⁹ AUB, *Socio-Economic Survey of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon*, 2015 (to be published). See also, DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 16-17.

¹⁶⁰ US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>.

¹⁶¹ “Palestinian groups in refugee camps operated an autonomous and arbitrary system of justice outside the control of the state. For example, local popular committees in the camps attempted to resolve disputes using tribal methods of reconciliation. If the case involved a killing, the committees occasionally transferred the accused to state authorities for trial”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>.

¹⁶² The Government of Lebanon responded to these findings saying that “any proven violations of the rights of arrested, detained or imprisoned persons remained isolated cases”; United Nations, *Report of the Committee against Torture, Fifty-First Session (28 October–22 November 2013) Fifty-Second Session (28 April–23 May 2014), Annex XIII - Summary Account of the Results of the Proceedings Concerning the Inquiry on Lebanon*, A/69/44, 2 October 2014, <http://bit.ly/1SQ8WFt>, paras 29, 48.

reported of “*persistent reports*” of torture and ill-treatment of Palestinians, among others, in pre-trial detention.¹⁶³

3. Palestinian Individuals in Conflict with Armed Factions

Palestinian individuals may reportedly be at risk of being subjected to harassment, threats or abuse at the hands of militant factions in the camps. As the Lebanese authorities have no access to the camps (with the exception of Nahr El-Bared Camp), those at risk can reportedly not seek protection from the Lebanese authorities. Whether or not the concerned individual could seek protection from political factions or inter-factional popular/security committees¹⁶⁴ in the camp reportedly depends on the individual’s political affiliations and/or connections with influential persons or families.¹⁶⁵

4. Nahr El-Bared Camp

Nahr El-Bared camp was originally established in 1949 to accommodate Palestine refugees from northern Palestine. It developed into the second largest camp in Lebanon, with a population of about 30,000 residents.¹⁶⁶ The area of the camp is divided into the “old” camp and the “new” camp. The “old” camp is roughly 0.2 km² and UNRWA is responsible for providing services to the population residing there.

An armed confrontation between the Islamist Fatah Al-Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) between May and September 2007 reportedly resulted in the death of dozens of civilians and the displacement of over 27,000 camp residents who fled Nahr El-Bared camp to nearby Beddawi camp.¹⁶⁷ Heavy artillery and aerial bombardments of Nahr El-Bared camp during a three-month siege reportedly resulted in an estimated 95 per cent of all buildings and infrastructure being destroyed or damaged beyond repair.¹⁶⁸ Numerous people were reportedly arrested and, at the time of writing, dozens are said to remain in detention. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted an Opinion in 2014, recognizing the arbitrary character of the detention of 72 persons arrested following the 2007

¹⁶³ United Nations, *Report of the Committee against Torture, Fifty-First Session (28 October–22 November 2013) Fifty-Second Session (28 April–23 May 2014), Annex XIII - Summary Account of the Results of the Proceedings Concerning the Inquiry on Lebanon, A/69/44*, <http://bit.ly/1SQ8WFt>, para. 10. See also, HRW, *Lebanon: UPR Submission March 2015*, 1 April 2015, <http://bit.ly/1oWLYjr>.

¹⁶⁴ The 1969 Cairo Agreement between the Palestinian leadership and the Lebanese government provided the framework for the establishment of semi-official Palestinian popular committees to fulfil municipal functions in the camps such as provision of water and electricity, collecting contributions in return for the provision of such services, coordination with UNRWA, as well as security functions (e.g. managing security in cases of theft, personal disputes, etc.). The committees are reportedly hampered by political divisions and rivalries which, in some instances, have led to the establishment of competing bodies within refugee camps; DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 18-21; Sari Hanafi, *Palestinians in Lebanon - Status, Governance and Security*, in: Accord, Issue 24, 2012, <http://bit.ly/1QboJwk>, pp. 68-69; Rebecca Roberts, *Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-term Displacement*, ISBN: 978 1 84511 971 3, 1 January 2010, pp. 147-149; Sari Hanafi, *Governing Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Arab East: Governmentalities in Search of Legitimacy*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs / American University of Beirut, Working Paper Series #1, October 2010, <http://bit.ly/1OpXjSz>, pp. 13-14; ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, p. 2, FN 6, and p. 22. Security committees reportedly engage in arbitrary detention even though they do not have the legal authority to do so, sometimes handing over detainees to the Lebanese authorities; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Lebanon: Ability of the Police to Arrest a Palestinian Refugee inside Beddawi Refugee Camp under Court Order*, 19 February 2014, LBN104774.E, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/54622d844.html>; Al-Hayat Newspaper, *Security Committees in Lebanon's Refugee Camps Take Law into their Hands*, 19 May 2013, bit.ly/1L56Gro; Al-Monitor, *Palestinians in Lebanon Camps Victims of Corrupt Security*, 15 December 2012, <http://almon.co/45i>.

¹⁶⁵ DIS, *Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2014, pp. 17-23.

¹⁶⁶ Jaber Suleiman, *Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, April 2006, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ This number of displaced is inclusive of Lebanese nationals, who lived in Nahr El-Bared camp and were subsequently displaced as a result of the conflict; UNRWA, *Reconstruction of Nahr El-Bared Camp & UNRWA Compound - Progress Report 1 September 2007 – 31 October 2010*, 2011, <http://bit.ly/1K7qMRC>, p. 5, FN 1. See also, Al Karama Foundation, *Lebanon: The Endless Injustice of «Nahr Al Bared» Case*, 4 June 2014, <http://bit.ly/1LAeNqJ>; BBC, *Profile: Fatah al-Islam*, 15 August 2010, <http://bbc.in/1SKmXVm>.

¹⁶⁸ UNRWA, *Relief and Early Recovery Appeal for Nahr El-Bared Camp - September 2008 to December 2009*, August 2008, <http://bit.ly/1K7qM42>, pp. 4-5.

Nahr El-Bared crisis.¹⁶⁹ Since the Lebanese Army entered the camp in September 2007, Lebanese authorities have exercised a level of control in Nahr El-Bared, unlike in the other refugee camps.¹⁷⁰

The Government of Lebanon and the international community committed to rebuild the destroyed camp at the 2008 Vienna Donor Conference,¹⁷¹ with UNRWA leading the relief and reconstruction efforts. In December 2015, more than eight years later, only fifty per cent of the “old” camp was reconstructed due to complex logistical, legal, political and financial challenges. As of May 2015, more than 9,200 residents were able to return to newly reconstructed apartments in the camp. A further 3,100 are set to return by the end of 2016, leaving just under 10,000 still displaced and struggling to cope with their reduced socioeconomic circumstances.¹⁷²

The prolonged displacement from Nahr El-Bared has reportedly resulted in acute humanitarian needs among the affected population. Emergency humanitarian relief provided to the displaced families, including food assistance, additional health care coverage, and rental cash subsidies, was reduced in 2013 and was finally stopped in September 2015 as a result of funding shortages.¹⁷³ In particular, the cut in rental subsidies exposed many of the over 1,800 affected families to the risk of eviction.¹⁷⁴ In addition, over 600 displaced families reportedly live in cramped conditions in sub-standard temporary shelters in the “new” area of the camp, which was built as a temporary emergency solution intended for a period of only three to four years.¹⁷⁵

The arrival of some 5,800 Palestine refugees from Syria¹⁷⁶ to Nahr El-Bared camp and Beddawi camp, in addition to an unknown number of Syrian refugees, since 2011, has reportedly created additional strain on already overstretched infrastructure and resources, and increased competition for housing and jobs. While approximately 600 new shops were constructed, economic activities are reportedly limited due to restrictions on movements in and out of the camps.¹⁷⁷

Five Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) checkpoints at the entrances to the camp reportedly control movement into and out of Nahr El-Bared through a permit and access regime covering the area of both the “old” camp and the “new” camp.¹⁷⁸ While initially very strict, restrictions on movement in and out of the camp have reportedly eased considerably since 2012.¹⁷⁹

¹⁶⁹ UN Human Rights Council, *Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 71st Session, 17-21 November 2014: No. 57/2014, Lebanon, 7 May 2015, A/HRC/WGAD/2014/57, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56cabe454.html>. The individuals concerned reportedly remain in detention; Al Karama Foundation, *Lebanon: Respect UN Opinion, Release Nahr al Bared Detainees*, 19 November 2015, <http://bit.ly/1VwxKQC>.*

¹⁷⁰ Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO), *Lebanese Restrictions on Freedom of Movement - Case of Naher El Bared Camp*, November 2010, <http://bit.ly/1PgvJX0>, p. 14.

¹⁷¹ Government of Austria, *Plassnik on Donor Conference in Vienna: ‘The Objective Has Been Achieved – Reconstruction Will Start in Autumn’ - Foreign Minister on Donor Conference for Nahr el Bared*, 23 June 2008, <http://bit.ly/1UXrUYu>.

¹⁷² Figures from UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, June 2015. “Many of those who had left Nahr el-Bared Camp following the conflict in 2007 continued to live in particularly difficult conditions”; UN Human Rights Council, *Compilation Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon*, 31 August 2015, para. 67.

¹⁷³ UNRWA, *Directors Update Advisory Commission Members on Latest Field Developments*, 16 November 2015, <http://bit.ly/1LAF5xL>.

¹⁷⁴ International organization in Lebanon, November 2015.

¹⁷⁵ International organization in Lebanon, December 2015.

¹⁷⁶ Figures as of November 2015; UNRWA Lebanon Field Office.

¹⁷⁷ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016. See also, ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, p. 74.

¹⁷⁸ ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Dilemma: The Struggle over Nahr al-Bared*, Middle East Report N° 117, 1 March 2012, <http://bit.ly/1Q4GWNV>, pp. ii and 5.

¹⁷⁹ “UNRWA stated the directorate generally approved such transfers. In 2012 authorities revoked the requirement to obtain an access permit to enter the Nahr el-Bared camp, and Lebanese and Palestinians entering the camps needed only to show their identity cards at LAF checkpoints outside the camp”; US Department of State, *2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Lebanon*, 25 June 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55a12.html>; Al Jazeera,

Military vehicles reportedly continue to conduct patrols and firearms are not permitted inside the camp.¹⁸⁰ While there is an Internal Security Forces (ISF) police station inside the camp intended to serve camp residents, the military has reportedly retained its role as the sole authority with the role of the ISF largely auxiliary.¹⁸¹

5. Rashidieh Camp

Rashidieh camp was established in 1936 just outside the city of Tyre. Rashidieh was heavily affected during the Lebanese civil war, especially between 1982 and 1987, with more than 5,000 refugees displaced and nearly 600 shelters totally or partially destroyed.¹⁸² It is estimated that since 2011, approximately 1,000 refugees from Syria have joined the existing camp population.¹⁸³

Rashidieh's residents mainly work as casual labourers in construction and agriculture. There is a high drop-out rate in schools as students are often forced to leave school in order to support their families. Shelters in the camp are reportedly small, cramped and often unsafe, with families adding storeys over the years to already unsound structures; some homes still have metal sheet roofing. Sewerage, drainage and water infrastructure is reported to be problematic, resulting in regular flooding in the winter. In addition, families whose shelters are located on the seafront reportedly experience regular flooding and extensive damages during winter storms.¹⁸⁴

In July 2015, tensions related to infrastructure works in the camp reportedly escalated into hostilities between armed elements.¹⁸⁵ The security situation in the camp reportedly deteriorated, with schools, shops and other services not able to function.¹⁸⁶ One man was reportedly killed and several wounded, with property in the camp damaged by arson and gunfire.¹⁸⁷ At the time of writing, the situation is reported to have relatively improved, but remains volatile.¹⁸⁸

6. Shatila Camp

Shatila camp is located in southern Beirut and was established in 1949 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to accommodate hundreds of refugees who fled from villages in Galilee in northern Palestine after 1948.¹⁸⁹

The camp covers an area of 0.4 km² and has grown to host approximately 18,000 persons, of which the majority, over 11,600, are Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA, including some 1,600 Palestine refugees from Syria.¹⁹⁰ Lebanese and foreign residents also live in the camp.¹⁹¹ Shatila has a total of four UNRWA installations, including a school, a health centre,

Free the Refugees of Nahr al-Bared, 26 June 2012, <http://bit.ly/20EhBiI>; Naharnet, *Report: Palestinian Factions, Army Strike Deal to End Tension*, 20 June 2012, <http://bit.ly/1PJQWd>.

¹⁸⁰ See PHRO, *Security for Freedom, the Impossible Trade: How the Lack of Human Rights Led to the Current Crisis in Nahr El-Bared*, 20 June 2012, <http://bit.ly/1PJDPc4>.

¹⁸¹ PHRO, *Camp in Fear, Camp in Want - Human Security Assessment for Nahr El-Bared Camp*, 2011, Item IV.6, <http://bit.ly/1nSjcje>.

¹⁸² UNRWA, *Where We Work – Camp Profiles*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1nyu6lf>.

¹⁸³ Approximately 31,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon officially live in Rashidieh camp, though the real figure is estimated to be lower; UNRWA information, January 2016.

¹⁸⁴ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

¹⁸⁵ The Daily Star, *Rashidieh Clashes Raise Fears of More Camp Violence*, 7 July 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PJDLsP>.

¹⁸⁶ Information provided by UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, January 2016. Although addressing a case of violence in Ein El-Hillweh camp, the UNRWA Commissioner General asserted in November 2015 that “it was not the first instance in which our schools in Lebanon were violated through factional violence, and the implications for Palestine refugee students are serious”; UNRWA, *Speech by UNRWA Commissioner-General at the General Assembly Fourth Committee*, 10 November 2015, <http://bit.ly/1K7pgvF>.

¹⁸⁷ The Daily Star, *Rashidieh Clashes Raise Fears of More Camp Violence*, 7 July 2015, <http://bit.ly/1PJDLsP>.

¹⁸⁸ International organization in Lebanon, January 2016.

¹⁸⁹ UNRWA, *Where We Work – Camp Profiles*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1nyu6lf>.

¹⁹⁰ Figures from UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, December 2015.

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., The National, *Shatila's Population Unknown as Palestinian Refugee Camp Bursts at Seams*, 14 January 2016, <http://bit.ly/1PvWDrL>.

a camp services office and a relief office. UNRWA also operates two schools in the neighbouring Sabra area.¹⁹²

From 1975 until 1990, during the Lebanese civil war, the camp was reportedly the scene of frequent clashes, resulting in the large-scale destruction of property and displacement of refugees.¹⁹³ During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Shatila and the neighbouring Sabra area were targeted in what the United Nations General Assembly acknowledged as a massacre.¹⁹⁴

Following the end of the civil war, Shatila camp reportedly became a refuge for many non-Palestinians, including illegal migrants and domestic workers who had escaped from their Lebanese employers, as well as Iraqi and Syrian refugees.¹⁹⁵ The burgeoning population has reportedly resulted in a strain on the already sub-standard infrastructure of the camp. Residents reportedly live in extremely poor and cramped conditions, with frequent cuts to water and electricity. One of the perils of the camp environment is an extensive network of criss-crossing electricity wires, which hang low between the narrow alleys of the camp and intertwine with water pipes. A number of deaths in the camp are reported every year from electrocution.¹⁹⁶

7. Ein El-Hilweh Camp

Ein El-Hilweh camp for Palestine refugees was established near the city of Sidon in 1948. The camp also received many refugees from other camps within Lebanon, particularly from near Tripoli, who had been displaced during the Lebanese civil war. As a result, Ein El-Hilweh became the biggest Palestine refugee camp in Lebanon with an estimated population of 80,000 people,¹⁹⁷ residing in an area of only 1.5 km². The camp inhabitants were reportedly particularly affected by violence between 1982 and 1991, which resulted in a high number of casualties and the near total destruction of the camp. Today, the camp population includes more than 5,000 Palestine refugees who fled the conflict from Syria.¹⁹⁸

Ein El-Hilweh's inhabitants mainly work as casual labourers in construction sites, orchards and embroidery workshops, or as cleaners. There is a comparatively high drop-out rate in schools as students are often forced to leave school in order to support their families. Shelters in the camp are reportedly small and very close to each other; some still have metal sheet roofing. A number of displaced refugees reportedly continue to live on the edge of the camp in extremely poor conditions.¹⁹⁹

In the 1980s and 1990s, Ein El-Hilweh camp reportedly became the main focus of groups considered jihadist, which sought to take advantage of the security vacuum that followed Israel's invasion in 1982.²⁰⁰ This situation still reportedly persists today, with not only members of such groups, but also fugitives wanted by Lebanese authorities reportedly residing in the camp.²⁰¹

¹⁹² Information provided by UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, January 2016.

¹⁹³ See, e.g., ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, p. 2.

¹⁹⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *The Situation in the Middle East*, A/RES/37/123, 16 December 1982, <http://bit.ly/1Q4IFCU>.

¹⁹⁵ See, e.g., Muftah, *A Brewing Crisis: Tensions between Palestinian & Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, 9 January 2014, <http://bit.ly/20onVp6>.

¹⁹⁶ The National, *Shatila's Population Unknown as Palestinian Refugee Camp Bursts at Seams*, 14 January 2016, <http://bit.ly/1PyWDrL>; The Guardian, *Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Camp Reliant on 'Hell Water' that Reduces Metal to Rust*, 26 May 2015, <http://bit.ly/1cgrY4x>.

¹⁹⁷ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), *From Syria to Ain el-Helweh: Alleviating the Suffering of Refugees in Saida*, 17 May 2013, <http://bit.ly/1QmAdJl>.

¹⁹⁸ UNRWA, *Where We Work – Camp Profiles*, accessed 23 February 2016, <http://bit.ly/1nyu6lf>.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ ICG, *Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps*, 19 February 2009, p. 24, FN 199.

²⁰¹ See, e.g., Naharnet, *Palestinian Rivals 'Agree Ceasefire' in Ain el-Hilweh*, 26 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1Te2CaP>; The Daily Star, *Palestinians Reach Cease-Fire Agreement in Ain al-Hilweh*, 23 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1POXNCl>; Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *Between Radicalization and Mediation Processes: a Political Mapping of Palestinian Refugee*

Most recently, in late August 2015, tensions between rival groups reportedly resulted in six days of fighting between the Fatah Party and the Salafist Jund Al-Sham and their respective allies, which led to six Palestinians being killed and or wounded, and some 3,000 Palestine refugees being displaced. Some houses were reportedly taken over by armed groups, and there was destruction of homes and infrastructure. According to reports, the fighting was triggered by the attempted assassination of a local Fatah member on 21 August 2015.²⁰² Heavy fighting was reported in the vicinity of a number of UNRWA installations, including schools and health clinics.²⁰³ Despite a ceasefire having been reached, the situation reportedly remains extremely tense in the camp.²⁰⁴ Newly formed Palestinian Joint Security Forces, composed of multiple Palestinian factions, ranging from secular to Islamic factions, including Fatah, Usbat Al-Ansar, Ansar Allah and the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, are reportedly in charge of law enforcement within the camp, in coordination with the Lebanese authorities, namely the Lebanese Army, which guard the entrances of Ein El-Hilweh Camp²⁰⁵ However, recent armed clashes have reportedly hampered the efficiency of this cooperation.²⁰⁶

Camps in Lebanon, Civil Society Knowledge Center, October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1TUcUw2>; Al-Monitor, *Terrorist Groups Exploit Palestinians in South Lebanon*, 12 March 2013, <http://bit.ly/1o5EdaQ>.

²⁰² Al Monitor, *Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon Becomes Battlefield for Fatah-Islamist Conflict*, 4 September 2015, <http://almon.co/2i9b>; Al Jazeera, *Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilweh*, 31 August 2015, <http://aje.io/hpyn>; Al Jazeera and AFP, *Deadly Clashes Hit Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon*, 25 August 2015, <http://aje.io/kakf>. See also, UN News Service, *UN Agency Expresses Concern over Plight of Civilians in Southern Lebanon Refugee Camp*, 25 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1hcAkg5>.

²⁰³ UN News Centre, *UN Agency Expresses Concern over Plight of Civilians in Southern Lebanon Refugee Camp*, 25 August 2015, <http://bit.ly/1oB3OIB>.

²⁰⁴ Al Jazeera, *Refugees Seek Lasting Peace in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilweh*, 31 August 2015, <http://aje.io/hpyn>.

²⁰⁵ Geneva Call, *Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: An Interview with Wissam Al-Saliby, One of Geneva Call's Trainer*, 10 October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1XkzoGd>; Al-Monitor, *Ain Al-Hilweh Refuge for Militants, Fugitives*, 11 December 2014, <http://almon.co/2b75>.

²⁰⁶ Geneva Call, *Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: An Interview with Wissam Al-Saliby, One of Geneva Call's Trainer*, 10 October 2015, <http://bit.ly/1XkzoGd>.